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Abstract— Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has become 
a widespread technology to automatically identify objects and with 
the development of cloud computing, cloud-based RFID systems 
attract more research these days. Several cloud-based RFID 
authentication protocols have been proposed to address privacy 
and security properties in the environment where the cloud 
provider is untrusted therefore the tag’s data are encrypted and 
anonymously stored in the cloud database. However, most of the 
cloud-based RFID authentication protocols assume secure 
communication channels between the reader and the cloud server. 
To protect data transmission between the reader and the cloud 
server without any help from a third party, this paper proposes a 
cloud-based RFID authentication protocol with insecure 
communication channels (cloud-RAPIC) between the reader and 
the cloud server. The cloud-RAPIC protocol preserves tag privacy 
even when the tag does not update its identification. The cloud-
RAPIC protocol has been analyzed using the UPriv model and 
AVISPA verification tool which have proved that the protocol 
preserves tag privacy and protects data secrecy.  
Keywords— RFID; Cloud-based; Authentication protocol; 
AVISPA; Privacy; Insecure channel 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless 
technology that uses radio signals to automatically identify 
objects. An RFID system consists of RFID tags, RFID readers, 
and a backend server. Tags are attached to objects to identify 
them uniquely and store the identification information of 
objects. The reader and the tag exchange data via radio signals. 
In passive RFID tags, the reader requests the tag to transmit its 
secret data when it enters the reader zone. The reader then 
forwards the data to the backend server, which manages the tag’s 
data in its database. The main advantage of using RFID systems 
is their ability to provide contactless identification of many 
physical objects at low cost, however, security and privacy 
concerns have become a major issue. The adversary has the 
ability to eavesdrop on messages exchanged between the tag and 
the reader, modify and block messages, and trace and corrupt 
tags. A broad range of research has thus been conducted to 
address security problems of RFID systems among which 
mutual authentication between tag, reader, and server is a 
challenging issue.  
There are two types of architecture used in RFID mutual 
authentication schemes where both the tag and the reader tell 
each other their own identities: server-based authentication and 
server-less authentication [1]. The server-based RFID 
architecture involves the use of a secure backend server that 
stores tags’ data. In order to identify a tag, the reader 
communicates with the tag using radio signals, which are 
assumed to be insecure. Then, the reader sends the tag response 
through a secure communication channel to the back-end server. 
The back-end server authenticates the reader and verifies the 
tag’s identity using the stored secret information of tags, and 
informs the reader if the tag is valid. 
In the mutual authentication of a server-less RFID, the 
readers authenticate tags without the intervention from an online 
back-end server. Instead, the portable reader initially 
communicates with a Certificate Authority (CA) via a secure 
connection to download an Access List (AL). The AL contains 
the tag identification as index and the corresponding hash digest 
of the reader identification and tag’s secret key as a certificate to 
prevent forging. The readers can then authenticate tags offline 
without any help from the back-end server. 
With the rapid growth in cloud computing, a new RFID 
authentication scheme, which takes the advantages of cloud 
services, is gaining more attention these days. A cloud-based 
RFID authentication scheme reduces the cost of deploying RFID 
systems and improves system scalability. However, in this 
scheme, the cloud server may disclose the secret data of tags to 
remote attackers [2]. In addition, the reader usually 
communicates with the cloud server by using a wireless 
network. Thus, the tags’ data should be anonymously stored in 
the cloud server, and securing the data transmission between the 
reader and the cloud server is crucial.  
In 2012, Kiraz, Bingöl, Kardaş, and Birinci [3] proposed two 
anonymous RFID mutual authentication protocols for cloud-
based RFID architecture without using a trusted third party. 
Their proposals were designed to prevent a server side attack 
where the server administrator may disclose information from a 
user profile. The protocols are based on threshold cryptosystems 
to preserve tag anonymity even if the server is corrupted. The 
first protocol is based on (2, ݊) threshold homomorphic 
encryption which does not provide tag revocation. Thus, they 
proposed the other protocol to provide tag revocation up to ݐ 
tags; which is based on (ݐ, ݊) threshold homomorphic 
encryption.  
In 2013, Xie, Xie, Zhang, Zhang and Tang [1] proposed a 
cloud-based RFID authentication protocol was proposed which 
consists of four parties: RFID tag, RFID reader (referred to as 
cloud-RAP2013 in this paper), VPN agency, and a cloud server. 
It is assumed that the wireless communication channel between 
the reader and the tag is not secure, whereas the reader 
communicates with the cloud server through a virtual private 
network (VPN) with the help of a VPN agency. The tags and the 
readers’ data are stored in the cloud anonymously as an 
encrypted hash table because the cloud server is untrusted. The 
VPN agency provides a secure connection between the reader 
and the cloud server. However, the cost of implementing this 
protocol is relatively high due to the need of deploying a VPN 
agency to secure the communication channel between the reader 
and the cloud server. In the same year Kardas, Celik, Bingol and 
Levi [4] published another security and privacy RFID mutual 
authentication protocol was published which uses cloud services 
to provide system availability and scalability. The authors were 
concerned whether the confidentiality and privacy properties can 
be maintained with an untrusted cloud provider. Thus, they 
defined a new security and privacy model for cloud-based RFID 
authentication protocols and give the adversary different 
capabilities. Then, they evaluated their protocol, which achieves 
the privacy requirement based on their proposed model. 
In 2014, Chen, Wu, Sun, and Wang [5] proposed a privacy 
preserving authentication protocol for RFID systems that utilizes 
cloud computing was published. The scheme reduces search 
complexity from a linear search ܱ(ܰ) to a logarithmic search 
ܱ(݈݋݃	ܰ), where ܰ is the number of tags in the system. In 
addition, the protocol is designed to prevent de-synchronization 
and tracking attacks. The proposed protocol also avoids 
weakness in the tree-based structure since the adversary can 
obtain all the tags’ information if he can compromise a small 
number of tags. Also in 2014, Lin, Hsu, and Cheng [6] published 
a cloud-based authentication protocol for RFID supply chain 
systems which consists of four parties: RFID tag, RFID reader, 
a trust party, and a cloud database. The trust party helps to 
protect data during the transfer of ownership by updating and re-
encrypting the data. Nonetheless, the protocol cannot resist the 
denial of service attack since the adversary can replay 
ℎ(ܴ1), ܴ1⊕ܭ௥	to the tag many times, where ܭ௥ is a secret key 
shared between the reader and the tag, and ܴ1 is the reader’s 
pseudorandom number. 
In 2015, Abughazalah, Markantonakis, and Mayes [7] have 
analyzed the security of the cloud-based RFID authentication 
protocol [1], and pointed out that the cloud-RAP2013 [1] 
protocol violates data privacy and is vulnerable to location 
tracking and reader impersonation attacks in which the 
adversary can be authenticated as a legitimate reader without 
compromising the tag’s secret data. This vulnerability related to 
the way of calculating the new secret key of the tag.  To enhance 
the cloud-RAP2013 [1] protocol, an improved protocol called 
“Secure improved cloud-based RFID authentication protocol” 
was proposed in [7] (referred to as cloud-RAP2015 in this 
paper). It is assumed that the communication channel between 
the reader and the cloud server is secure whereas the cloud server 
may leak information to malicious attackers. However, this 
assumption is not practical for portable readers since they 
communicate with the cloud server via a wireless network. In 
addition, the protocol does not protect tag privacy between any 
two authentication sessions.  Therefore, the attacker can 
intercept any data transmitted between the reader and the cloud 
server to perform any possible attack. In addition, the tags’ data 
should be stored anonymously because the cloud provider is 
untrusted. 
However, none of the examined protocols above was 
designed with the purpose of protecting data transmissions in 
cloud-based RFID systems with insecure communication 
channels between the reader and the cloud server. 
Motivated by the above observations, the research in the 
paper is aimed to propose a Cloud-based RFID Authentication 
Protocol capable to resisting the attacks that may arise in the 
Insecure Communication channel (Cloud-RAPIC) between the 
reader and the cloud server and to prevent the location tracking 
attack even if the tag fails to update its identifier. The 
contribution of this paper is that we have improved the cloud-
RAP2015 protocol [7] to meet the security and privacy 
requirements for cloud-based RFID systems with mobile 
readers. We show that our protocol can resist attacks of RFID 
systems with insecure channels between the reader and the cloud 
server. Finally, we compare all of the three cloud-based RFID 
authentication protocols including the cloud-RAP2013 protocol 
[1], the cloud-RAP2015 protocol [7] and cloud-RAPIC in terms 
of privacy and security properties satisfied. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
discusses RFID system privacy and security requirements and 
the adversary model. In Section III, we describe the proposed 
cloud-RAPIC protocol. Section IV shows the evaluation of the 
cloud-RAPIC protocol and a conclusion will be highlighted in 
Section V. 
II. RFID SYSTEM SECURITY AND ADVERSARY MODEL 
A. Privacy and Security Requirement 
The requirements of RFID systems can be grouped into two 
main categories: privacy and security [8[. Tag privacy is one of 
the most important issues since the tag is attached to a specific 
product or its owner.  
• Tag data anonymity: The tag’s secret data should not be 
revealed to any unauthorized entity. Thus, only a 
legitimate party can access these data. 
• Tag location privacy: The adversary should not be able 
to identify the tag or find a link between any two 
anonymous transactions performed by the same tag.  
The following security requirements are important to be 
satisfied in the design of RFID authentication protocols. 
• Confidentiality: Ensure the secrecy of all secret data and 
encrypt them when they are passed through wireless 
links.  
• Forward Untraceability: The tag’s transmitted data 
should not be the same for different transactions. The 
knowledge of a tag’s secret data enables the attacker to 
trace the future transactions of the compromised tag. 
• Backward Untraceability: The adversary should not be 
able to establish a link between the current and the past 
transaction. Thus, preventing the adversary from tracing 
all of the past transactions using knowledge of a tag’s 
current secret information is important because the 
knowledge of a current secret may expose past 
transactions.  
• Resistance to replay attack: The adversary should not be 
able to forward any of the previously exchanged 
messages to be authenticated as a legitimate party. 
• Resistance to de-synchronization: A legitimate tag 
should be able to be authenticated by the reader when 
needed. Thus, RFID protocols usually keep a copy of the 
previous tag’s data until the next authentication session. 
• Resistance to tag impersonation: The adversary should 
not be able to impersonate a legitimate tag to a legitimate 
reader unless the tag is compromised. 
• Resistance to reader impersonation: The adversary 
should not be able to impersonate a legitimate reader 
even when colluding with a compromised tag. 
• Mutual authentication: A legitimate reader, tag and the 
cloud server should be able to safely authenticate each 
other using a secure mechanism.  
• Data integrity: Prevent the modification of tag data sent 
over insecure channel by using a verification technique 
that ensures data accuracy and consistency. 
B. Adversary Model 
We assume that an adversary ܣ has full control of the 
wireless communication channel between the reader and the tag. 
Thus, ܣ is able to perform a passive attack by eavesdropping and 
analyzing messages over legitimate sessions of the protocol. 
Additionally, ܣ can perform an active attack such as store, edit, 
corrupt, replay, block, and inject messages. We also assume that 
ܣ always knows the cipher text, how the protocol works and the 
functions executed at each party. Therefore, ܣ can potentially 
impersonate a legitimate tag or reader by following the steps 
specified under the protocol. We define two types of the 
adversary model according to his capabilities. 
• Weak adversary model: The adversary has all of the 
capabilities mentioned above but he is not able to 
access the data in the cloud server. 
• Strong adversary model: The adversary has all of the 
capabilities mentioned above. In addition, he also has 
the capability to access the data in the cloud server and 
analyse the data stored in the database to find any 
relationship between them. 
III. THE CLOUD-RAPIC PROTOCOL 
A. Design Principle and Notations 
The goal of the proposed protocol is to protect tag’s data in an 
untrusted cloud server and achieve the privacy and security 
properties for RFID systems with mobile readers. The proposed 
cloud-RAPIC protocol is based on the strengths of cloud- 
RAP2013 protocol [1] and the robustness of the cloud-RAP2015 
protocol [7]. In addition, we introduce ideas in order to prevent 
attacks that are found in both protocols and secure data between 
the reader and the cloud server.  
 
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS USED IN THE CLOUD-RAPIC PROTOCOL 
Notation Description 
ܶ݅݀௜ A unique identifier of the  ݅௧௛ tag 
ܴ݅݀ The reader identifier 
ܭ௜ The secret key of the  ݅௧௛ tag 
ܭ௥௦ A symmetric key shared between the reader and the cloud server 
ܴ1 The reader’s pseudorandom number 
ܴ2 The tag’s pseudorandom number  
ܧ௠௞(. ) Encrypted data using a master key shared between all system readers 
ܦ௠௞(ܧ௠௞(. )) Decryption of the encrypted data  
ܬ The transaction number 
ℎ(ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ) A one way hash function of ܴ݅݀ and the new tag identifier ܶ݅݀  
ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵฮܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ݔ) Encrypted tag’s new data for the next transaction 
ℎ(ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ) A one way hash function of ܴ݅݀ and the old tag identifier ܶ݅݀ 
ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ฮܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ‖ݔ) Encrypted tag’s old data of the previous transaction 
ݔ A value specifies whether the tag keeps new/old values of ܶ݅݀ and ܭ 
ℎ(. )௅ The left half part of the hash value 
ℎ(. )ோ The right half part of the hash value 
 
 The cloud-RAPIC protocol uses the notations listed in Table 
II, extending from those used in cloud-RAP2013 [1] and cloud-
RAP2015 [7]. 
B. The Encryted Hash Table  in Cloud-RAPIC 
In cloud-based RFID authentication protocols, the data of the 
rags and readers are stored in the cloud anonymously as an 
encrypted hash table (EHT). The proposed Cloud-RAPIC 
protocol uses ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜) as index field in the EHT and ℎ(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ݔ) in the data field as shown in Table II, i.e. ܶ ݅݀௜	and ܭ௜ are updated after each successful protocol execution. In the 
cloud-RAPIC protocol, we assume that the communication 
channel between the reader and the cloud server is not secure.  
C. Protocol Description 
The proposed cloud-RAPIC protocol has two phases: the 
initialization phase and the authentication phase. 
 Initialization phase: The system operator should do the 
following in a closed environment before using the protocol.  
1) In the i୲୦ tag: the system operator assigns the tag ܶ݅݀ூ, ܭூ and ܴ݅݀. 
2) In the reader: the system operator assigns the ܴ݅݀, the 
reader’s master key ݉݇ and the shared secret key ܭ௥௦ 
with the cloud server.  
TABLE II.  THE ENCRYPTED HASH TABLE FORMAT OF CLOUD-RAPIC 
Old_index_field Old_data_field New_index_field New_data_field 
ℎ(ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ) ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ฮܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ‖ݔ) ℎ(ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ) ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵฮܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ݔ) 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
ℎ(ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ) ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ฮܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ‖ݔ) ℎ(ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ) ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵฮܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ݔ) 
  
ܶܽ݃௜  	ܴ݁ܽ݀݁ݎ  ܥ݈݋ݑ݀	ܵ݁ݎݒ݁ݎ 
   1. ܩ݁݊݁ݎܽݐ݁ ܽ ݎܽ݊݀݋݉ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ܴ1   
2. ܩ݁݊݁ݎܽݐ݁	ܽ	random	number	ܴ2 
    ܯ1 = ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܴ1) ⊕ ℎ൫ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜൯				ܯ2 = ܶ݅݀௜ ⊕ ܴ2 
   ܯ3 = ℎ(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ܴ1‖ܴ2) 
2.		ܯ1,ܯ2,ܯ3 
 
 
 
  3. ܥ݈ܽܿݑ݈ܽݐ݁: ܯ1 ⊕ ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܴ1)   
 
   4. ݏ݁ܽݎܿℎ	݂݋ݎ ℎ൫ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜൯ 
ܴ݁ݐݎ݅݁ݒ݁ ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ݔ) 
 
 
    5. ܦ௠௞(ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ݔ))
				ܱܾݐܽ݅݊ ܴ2 ݂ݎ݋݉ ܯ2⊕ ܶ݅݀௜
				ܯ3ᇱ = ℎ(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ܴ1‖ܴ2)				Verify		ܯ3ᇱ == ܯ3	
				݂݅	݉ܽݐܿℎ	{	
							݈ܿܽܿݑ݈ܽݐ݁:	ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ൯	
																										ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ⊕ ܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ൯			
							݂݅	(	ݔ = ݊݁ݓ)	{	
										ݑ݌݀ܽݐ݁	ݐℎ݁	݀ܽݐܽ	݅݊	ݐℎ݁	݈ܿ݋ݑ݀	݀ܽݐܾܽܽݏ݁ 					
									ܿ݋݉݌ݑݐ݁:	ܣ = ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ฮܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ‖ݔ = ݋݈݀)		
																							ܤ = ℎ൫ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ൯	
																							ܥ = 	ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵฮܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ݔ = ݊݁ݓ)		
																							ܣݑݐℎ = ℎ(ܣ ⊕ ܤ⊕ ܥ‖ܴ1‖ܭ௥௦)	௅	
								}	
							݈݁ݏ݁		
																݊݋	ݑ݌݀ܽݐ݁	݅ݏ	ݎ݁ݍݑ݅ݎ݁݀, ݃݋	ݐ݋	ݏݐ݁݌	7	
}	
	
 
 
 
   6. ܸ݁ݎ݂݅ݕ: ܣݑݐℎᇱ == ܣݑݐℎ 
݂݅	݉ܽݐܿℎ	 
		ܹݎ݅ݐ݁:	 
ܱ݈݀	݅݊݀݁ݔ	݂݈݅݁݀ ← ℎ൫ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ൯ 
ܱ݈݀	݀ܽݐܽ	݂݈݅݁݀ ← ܣ 
ܰ݁ݓ	݅݊݀݁ݔ	݂݈݅݁݀ ← ܤ 
ܰ݁ݓ	݀ܽݐܽ	݂݈݅݁݀ ← ܥ 
 
   
7. ܸ݁ݎ݂݅ݕ: ܣݑݐℎ == ℎ(ܣ⊕ ܤ⊕ ܥ‖ܴ1‖ܭ௥௦) ோ 
            ܥ݈ܽܿݑ݈ܽݐ݁: ܯ4 = ℎ(ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ܴ1‖ܴ2) 
 
 
 
8. ܥ݈ܽܿݑ݈ܽݐ݁:	ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ൯ 
                   ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ⊕ ܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ൯  
				ܸ݁ݎ݂݅ݕ	ܯ4 == ℎ(ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ܴ1‖ܴ2)  
				ܶℎ݁݊	ݑ݌݀ܽݐ݁	ܶ݅݀௜	&	ܭ௜ 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The authentication phase of the cloud-RAPIC protocol 
3. ℎ൫ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜൯, ܴ1
4. ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ݔ)
5. ܣ, ܤ, ܥ, ܣݑݐℎ
6. ℎ(ܣ ⊕ ܤ⊕ ܥ‖ܴ1‖ܭ௥௦)	ோ 
1. ܴ1 
7.		ܯ4 
 3) In the cloud server: the system operator assigns the key 
ܭ௥௦ shared between the reader and the cloud server, a 
unique ℎ൫ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜൯ in the ܰ݁ݓ_݅݊݀݁ݔ_݂݈݅݁݀ and the 
corresponding encrypted data ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖݊݁ݓ)	 in 
the ܰ݁ݓ_݀ܽݐܽ_݂݈݅݁݀. The data in the 
ܱ݈݀_݅݊݀݁ݔ_݂݈݅݁݀ and ܱ݈݀_݀ܽݐܽ_݂݈݅݁݀ are set to null 
initially. 
Authentication phase: This process involves the following 
sequence of steps as illustrated in Fig. 1.  
1) ࡾࢋࢇࢊࢋ࢘ → ࢀࢇࢍ࢏: ࡾ૚  
     The reader generates a random number ܴ1 and sends it as a 
challenge to the tag. 
2) ࢀࢇࢍ࢏ → ࡾࢋࢇࢊࢋ࢘:ࡹ૚,ࡹ૛,ࡹ૜  
     The tag generates ܴ2 and calculates the following for 
authentication purpose:   
									ܯ1 = ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܴ1)⊕ ℎ൫ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜൯, ℎ൫ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜൯ is used 
as an index field in the cloud server to retrieve the ݐܽ ௜݃ data. 
									ܯ2 = ܶ݅݀௜ ⊕ ܴ2 
        ܯ3 = ℎ(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ܴ1‖ܴ2), ܯ3 is used to authenticate the ݅௧௛  tag. 
3) 	ࡾࢋࢇࢊࢋ࢘ → ࡿࢋ࢘࢜ࢋ࢘ ∶ ࢎ൫ࡾ࢏ࢊ‖ࢀ࢏ࢊ࢏൯, ࡾ૚  
     The reader calculates ܯ1 ⊕ ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܴ1) and sends 
ℎ൫ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜൯, ܴ1	to the cloud server in order to retrive the data 
related to the ݅௧௛  tag. 
4) ࡿࢋ࢘࢜ࢋ࢘ → ࡾࢋࢇࢊࢋ࢘ ∶ ࡱ࢓࢑(ࢀ࢏ࢊ࢏‖ࡷ࢏‖࢞):  
     The server searches among all values stored in the 
ܱ݈݀	݅݊݀݁ݔ	݂݈݅݁݀ and ܰ݁ݓ_݅݊݀݁ݔ_݂݈݅݁݀ (see Table II) for the 
matching ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜). If there is a match, it retrieves the 
associated ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ݔ) and sends it to the reader where ݔ 
specifies whether the tag stores the new or old data of ܶ݅݀௜ and ܭ௜ in its memory. 
5) ࡾࢋࢇࢊࢋ࢘ → ࡿࢋ࢘࢜ࢋ࢘ ∶	 ࡭,࡮, ࡯,࡭࢛࢚ࢎ  
     The reader obtains the tag ܶ݅݀௜, ܭ௜ and ݔ by decrypting the 
data using its master key ݉݇. Then, it extracts ܴ2 from ܯ2⊕
ܶ݅݀௜ to verify the correctness of the received ܯ3. The reader 
calculates ܯ3′ = ℎ(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜‖ܴ1‖ܴ2) to authenticate the tag. 
Moreover, the reader authenticates the cloud server if the data 
in the cloud are identical to those received from the tag.  
     If ܯ3′ ==ܯ3, the reader updates the tag’s data as 
following: 
									ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ൯	
									ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ⊕ ܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ൯	
 Then, the reader checks the synchronization of tag’s data 
with the data in the cloud server based on the value of ݔ.  
• If ݔ = ݊݁ݓ, the tag is synchronized and the data should 
be updated to be used in the next transaction: 
ܣ = ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ฮܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ‖ݔ = ݋݈݀)	 
ܤ = ℎ൫ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ൯	
ܥ = 	ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵฮܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ݔ = ݊݁ݓ)		
     The reader computes and sends the left half of the 
authentication message for integrity and authentication purpose, 
i.e., ܣݑݐℎ = ℎ(ܣ⊕ ܤ⊕ ܥ‖ܴ1‖ܭ௥௦)	௅. 
• If ݔ = ݋݈݀, no update is required and go to step 7). 
6) ࡿࢋ࢘࢜ࢋ࢘ → ࡾࢋࢇࢊࢋ࢘ ∶ ࢎ(࡭⊕࡮⊕࡯‖ࡾ૚‖ࡷ࢙࢘)	ࡾ  
     The server checks the integrity of the left half of the received 
ܣݑݐℎ == ℎ(ܣ⊕ܤ⊕ ܥ‖ܴ1‖ܭ௥௦)	௅. If a match is found, the 
server updates the database and replies with the right half ܣݑݐℎ 
of as an acknowledgement to the reader: 
ܱ݈݀_݅݊݀݁ݔ_݂݈݅݁݀ ← ℎ൫ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ൯	
ܱ݈݀_݀ܽݐܽ_݂݈݅݁݀ ← ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ฮܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ‖݋݈݀)		
ܰ݁ݓ_݅݊݀݁ݔ_݂݈݅݁݀ ← ℎ൫ܴ݅݀ฮܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ൯	
ܰ݁ݓ_݀ܽݐܽ_݂݈݅݁݀ ← ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ฮܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖݊݁ݓ)		
7) ࡾࢋࢇࢊࢋ࢘ → ࢀࢇࢍ࢏:ࡹ૝  
     The reader verifies the right half part of the received 
authentication message ℎ(ܣ⊕ ܤ⊕ܥ‖ܴ1‖ܭ௥௦)	ோ only if step 
3) is performed by the protocol. Then, the reader computes 
ܯ4 = ℎ(ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ܴ1‖ܴ2) in order to be authenticated by the tag 
and inform the tag to update its data. 
8) ࢀࢇࢍ࢏: The tag calculates the following: 
ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃ ൯ 
ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ ← ℎ൫ܶ݅݀௡௘௪௃ାଵ ⊕ ܭ௢௟ௗ௃ ൯, 	ܬ is the transaction number. 
     Then, the tag verifies the correctness of the received  ܯ4 =
= ℎ(ܭ௡௘௪௃ାଵ‖ܴ1‖ܴ2); if it compares successfully, the reader will 
be authenticated and the tag’s data will be updated. Otherwise, 
the reader will not be authenticated and the tag will keep its old 
data of ܶ݅݀௢௟ௗ௃  and ܭ௢௟ௗ௃ . 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF CLOUD-RAPIC 
This section analyses the cloud-RAPIC protocol and 
formally verifies the privacy and security requirements 
discussed in section II.A. 
A. Analysis of The Cloud-RAPIC Protocol 
• Tag data anonymity: The tag’s secret data are encrypted 
before being transmitted in the insecure channel. 
Moreover, the index field in the cloud database, which is 
used to extract the encrypted tag’s data is stored as a hash 
value of the reader Rid concatenated with tag Tid୧ as 
shown in Table II. Thus the adversary cannot establish 
any link between the Old_index_field and the 
New_index_field.  
• Tag location privacy (Untraceability): Although the tag 
updates its secret data Tid୧ and K୧ in the cloud_RAP2015 
protocol [7] after each successful session, the tag is still 
vulnerable to location tracking attack until it updates its 
Tid୧ since the tag response is static for h(Tid୧) in M1. 
Thus, in the cloud_RAPIC protocol we modify the tag 
response in M1 using Rid which is known previously to 
the tag during the initialization phase of the protocol. 
Therefore, whenever the tag is queried, its response will 
appear random due to the use of a fresh random number 
R1 within the hash function. 
• Mutual Authentication: the cloud_RAP2015 protocol [7] 
efficiently satisfies the mutual authentication between 
the reader and the tag but not between the reader and the 
cloud server. Thus, in the cloud_RAPIC protocol we 
introduce the use of the secret key K୰ୱ to provide an 
authentication procedure between the reader and the 
cloud server, which is used to calculate the message 
Auth = h(A⊕ B⊕ C‖R1‖K୰ୱ)	୐ in order to 
authenticate the reader by the cloud server. 
• Resistant to replay attack: The cloud_RAPIC protocol 
resists replay attacks between the reader and the cloud 
server using the reader’s random number R1 in the 
message Auth = h(A⊕ B⊕ C‖R1‖K୰ୱ)	୐. Thus, the 
adversary cannot reuse this message in later sessions of 
the protocol. 
• Resistant to de-synchronisation attack: The value that 
specifies the synchronisation of tag’s data (x=old/new) is 
encrypted by the reader’s master key in E୫୩(Tid୧‖K୧‖x). 
Thus, the adversary cannot change this value since the 
reader is the only entity that can extract this value.  
• Tag data integrity: The authentication message       
h(A⊕ B⊕ C‖R1‖K୰ୱ)	୐ is also used to ensure the 
integrity of the A, B	and	C messeges sent to the cloud 
server. When the cloud server receives A, B	and	C  it re-
calculates the Auth message using the received R1 and 
the secret key K୰ୱ share with the reader. 
B. Formal Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the cloud-RAPIC protocol to 
verify the privacy of tag’s holders and the security of tag’s data. 
1) Verifying the tag’s privacy using UPriv:  
We evaluate the privacy requirements using the UPriv model 
(UPriv) proposed by Ouafi and Phan [9] which was proposed to 
evaluate the privacy requirement in RFID protocols. The model 
can be described as follows:   
  The protocol parties are T ∈ Tags and R ∈ Readers that 
interact with each other in protocol sessions. The 
communication channel between the tag and reader is assumed 
to be fully controlled by the adversary A who communicates 
with them passively or actively. The communication channel 
between the reader and the cloud server is assumed to be fully 
controlled by the adversary A too. The Adversary A has the 
ability to issue the following queries: 
• Execute (R, T, i) query: This query allows A to perform a 
passive attack by eavesdropping a session i between R and 
T during an honest execution of the protocol. Therefore, A 
can read all messages exchanged between R and T. 
• Send (U, V, m, i) query: This query allows the adversary A 
to perform an active attack by impersonating a legitimate 
reader U∈Readers in a session i of the protocol and sending 
a message m to a tag V∈Tags. In addition, the adversary is 
allowed to modify or block a message m during its 
transmission between R and T. 
• Corrupt (T, K) query: This query returns the secret key K_i 
of a tag T∈Tags if the adversary can perform a physical 
attack and get access to the tag’s memory. 
• Test (T, i) query: This query allows the adversary A to 
invoke a Test query for session i. Depending on a randomly 
selected bit b∈{0,1}, A is given T_b∈{T_0,T_1} randomly, 
where T_0 represents the targeted tag and T_1 is any other 
tag in the system. If A can guess the bit b correctly, then he 
will succeed to identify his target. 
Untraceable privacy (UPriv) [9] is defined by using the game 
݃ played by an adversary ܣ and a collection of session instances 
between the reader and the tag. The game ݃ involves three 
phases: learning, challenge, and guess phase.  
• Phase 1 (Learning): The adversary	ܣ	eavesdrops on a 
legitimate session (i + 1) using Execute (R, T଴, i + 1) 
query during the execution of the protocol between a tag 
T଴ and the reader R. Thus, A obtains the following: 
M1 = h(Rid‖R1)⊕ h൫Rid‖Tid୘଴൯ 
M2 = Tid୘଴ ⊕ R2 
M3 = h(Tid୘଴‖K୘଴‖R1‖R2) 
• Phase 2 (Challenge): A is given a tag Tୠ ∈ {T଴, Tଵ}, A 
starts a new session with Tୠ and generates his random 
number Ri ,then A sends Ri using a Send (R, Tୠ, Ri, i +1) query to the tag Tୠ and obtains the following: 
M1 = h(Rid‖Ri) ⊕ h൫Rid‖Tid୘ୠ൯ 
M2 = Tid୘ୠ ⊕ R2 
M3 = h(Tid୘ୠ‖K୘ୠ‖Ri‖R2) 
• Phase 3 (Guess): The adversary ܣ cannot find any       
relationship between the tag ଴ܶ response in the learning 
phase and the tag ௕ܶ response in the challenge phase 
since the response is changed every time the tag is 
queried. 
 This is due to the use of fresh random numbers ܴ1 and ܴ2 in 
all messages ܯ1,ܯ2, and	ܯ3. Moreover, the tag response looks 
random whenever it queried since the reader random number ܴ 1 
is encrypted within the hash value in ܯ1. 
2) Verifying data secrecy using AVISPA:  
A number of successful verification tools have been proposed 
by developers to analyze and validate security protocols, such 
as Casper/FDR developed in [10], the extended ProVerif [11], 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The architecture of the AVIPA tool  
and Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and 
Applications (AVISPA) developed by Armando et al. [12]. 
These tools use different models and verification techniques.   
We formally evaluated the security properties of the protocol 
using the AVISPA verification tool [12] since it employs four 
back-ends with different validation techniques: On-the-Fly 
Model-Checker (OFMC), Constraint Logic-Based Attack 
Searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-Based Model-Checker (SATMC), 
and Tree Automata-Based Protocol Analyzer (TA4SP). These 
model checker tools are all based on the same specification 
language, called High Level Protocol Specification Language 
(HLPSL). The AVISPA platform uses a translator called 
HLPSL2IF, which transforms a HLPSL specification of 
security protocols written by the user into a low level 
specification called Intermediate Format which can be analyzed 
by the four back-end tools as shown in Fig.2.  
Six HLPSL sections were declared: the reader, the tag, the 
server, the session, the environment roles, and the security goal 
section. Moreover, we defined the adversary’s capabilities and 
the goals for each security property that the proposed protocol 
should satisfy.  
Secrecy is modelled by means of the goal predicate secret. 
For instance, the secrecy of ܭ௥௦ shared between the reader and 
the cloud server is modelled by means of the goal predicate 
secret(Krs,rs_Acc_Pass,{R,S}) which implies that the ܭ௥௦ is a 
secret shared between agent R and agent S and rs_Acc_Pass is 
the secret term that should be declared as a constant in the goal 
section. When the adversary learns this secret value, the security 
property will be violated. 
Authentication property is modelled by means of witness and 
request events. For instance, the authentication property between 
the reader and the cloud server is modelled by means of witness 
and request as following: R and the S should certainly agree on 
the exchanged message ܣݑݐℎ. Thus, we have modelled a strong 
authentication of R by S using the goal predicate 
 
Fig. 3. Evaluation result of the cloud-RAPIC protocol  
witness(R, S, s_auth_r, Auth') which declares that agent reader 
witness for the value ܣݑݐℎ’, while request(S, R, s_auth_r, Auth') 
is used for strong authentication property of R by S which 
declares that agent server requests a check of the value ܣݑݐℎ’. 
This goal is declared by the constant s_auth_r in the goal section.  
The evaluation results of the AVISPA tool shows that the 
protocol is safe and satisfies all of the security and authentication 
properties defined in the goal section as presented in Fig. 3. 
C. Security and Privacy Comparison 
In this section we compare the proposed cloud-RAPIC 
protocol with the cloud-RAP2013 protocol [1] and the cloud-
RAP2015 protocol [7].  
In the cloud-RAP2013 protocol [1], when the tag enters the 
reader zone, it generates ܯ1 = ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜) as an 
authentication request to the reader. The reader then passes the 
index message ܯ1 to the cloud server to retrieve the tag’s data 
ܧ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜) and verifies ܴ݅݀ by checking the integrity of ܴ݅݀, obtains ܶ݅݀௜ and ܭ௜; then it generates a random number ܴ1 
as a challenge to the tag.  
The tag responses by calculating ܯ2 = ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܴ1) 
and generating a random number ܴ2 as its challenge to the 
reader. The reader checks the tag’s response, and if it compares 
successfully, the reader sends queries to the cloud server 
ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖(ܭ௜ + 1)) and verifies the answers until it finds the 
last valid record ܧ(ܴ݅݀, ܶ݅݀௜,ܯ) where ܯ is the last number of 
a session between a reader and a tag. If	ܭ௜ = ܯ, this means that 
the tag is synchronized with the cloud server. Otherwise, the tag 
has been desynchronised. 
Then, the reader updates the data and sends to the cloud 
server ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܯ′) and	ܧ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܯ′), where	ܯᇱ =ܯ + 1. The cloud server writes the new record into the database, 
calculates		ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܯ′)⊕ ℎ(ܧ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܯ′)), and 
sends it to the reader. After the cloud- server confirms the 
updating process, then the reader calculates 
ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܴ2)⊕ܯ′ and ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܯ′) and sends them 
to the tag to update its data. The tag computes ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܴ2) 
XORed with ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܴ2)⊕ܯ′ in order to obtain		ܯ′, 
then verifies the correctness of ℎ(ܴ݅݀‖ܶ݅݀௜‖ܯ′) and updates ܭ௜ = ܯ′. 
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However, the authors in the the cloud-RAP2015 [7] protocol 
pointed out that the cloud-RAP2013 [1] protocol violates data 
privacy and is vulnerable to location tracking, and reader 
impersonation attacks in which the adversary can be 
authenticated as a legitimate reader without compromising the 
tag’s secret data. This vulnerability related to the way of 
calculating the new secret key of the tag ܯᇱ = ܯ + 1	.  
The cloud-RAP2015 [7] protocol assumes a secure 
communication channel between the reader and the cloud server. 
The data in the cloud server is stored in a form as encrypted hash 
table. That is, the reader uses a hash function to encrypt tag’s 
ܶ݅݀௜ as an index field ℎ(ܶ݅݀௜)  and encrypts the tag’s 
data		ܧ௠௞(ܶ݅݀௜‖ܭ௜) in the corresponding data field using its 
master key. However, this assumption is not suitable for RFID 
systems with portable readers and the tag is vulnerable to the 
location tracking attack until it updates its identifier. We 
evaluate the cloud-RAP2015 [7] protocol using the UPriv model 
[9] and the AVISPA verification tool [10] and find that without 
the secure channel assumption the adversary can perform a man-
in-the middle attack in which the adversary can de-synchronize 
the tag and the cloud database in one protocol session. 
 Security comparisons between all of the three cloud-based 
authentication protocols are shown in Table III. The properties 
on cloud-RAP2013 protocol [1] come from the analysis made in 
[7] and the properties of cloud-RAP2015 protocol are conducted 
by us. The notation × denotes that a protocol does not satisfy the 
given requirement while the notation √ means that the 
requirement is satisfied in a scheme. The notation ∆ means that 
the mutual authentication between the reader and the cloud  
TABLE III.  PRIVACY AND SECURITY COMPARISONS 
 
Properties 
 
Cloud-
RAP2013 
Cloud-
RAP2015 
Cloud-
RAPIC 
Tag data anonymity × × √ 
Resistance to location 
tracking × × √ 
Resistance to forward 
Untraceability √ × √ 
Resistance to replay 
attack (Reader-Tag) √ √ √ 
Resistance to de-
synchronization 
(Reader-Tag) 
√ √ √ 
Resistance to tag 
impersonation  √ √ √ 
Resistance to reader 
impersonation × √ √ 
Mutual authentication 
(Reader-Tag) × √ √ 
Mutual authentication 
(Reader-Server) ∆ ∆ √ 
Data integrity 
(Reader-Server) × × √ 
× : not satisfied; √ : satisfied; ∆ : partially satisfied. 
server is partially satisfied where the reader authenticates the 
cloud server based on the correctness of the received tag’s data 
but there is no mechanism to authenticate the reader by cloud 
server.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed cloud-RAPIC, a cloud-based 
RFID authentication protocol with insure communication 
channels between the reader and the cloud server. The cloud-
RAPIC protocol protects data transmitted between all protocol 
parties without any help from a third party. Moreover, the cloud-
RAPIC protocol resists the location tracking attack between any 
two authentication sessions even if the tag does not update its 
identifier. We proved that cloud-RAPIC works well for RFID 
systems with mobile readers and satisfies a high level of security 
and privacy requirements. In addition, it does not require more 
computational capabilities at the reader and the tag sides 
compared with the original cloud-RAP2013 [1] and the 
improved cloud-RAP2015 [7] RFID authentication protocols. 
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